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Should The Rules of Marital Property Be
Normative?
Carolyn J. Frantzt
In January of this year, along with Hanoch Dagan, I pub-
lished a piece in the Columbia Law Review tracing the implica-
tions for marital property law of a particular normative view of a
good marriage.! Earlier, I had presented this paper to various
law faculties around the United States, and had encountered
repeatedly what was, at least initially, an unexpected critique:
that perhaps it is illegitimate for the government to attempt to
achieve any particular normative end through the institution of
marriage. Instead, the argument went, the government should
endeavor to be as hands-off as possible with respect to this
deeply personal attachment. The rules surrounding marriage, to
the extent they must do something, must simply facilitate the
actual desires of spouses, and not attempt to change those pref-
erences or social practices to achieve the government's own de-
sires for marriage, however salutary. Faced with this critique, I
convinced my co-author to reserve the question of the legitimacy
of normatively based marital property rules.2 It is to this ques-
tion that I now turn.
I do not purport in this Article to resolve the question. My
goal is only to present the critique in its clearest form, in the
hopes that it will spark broader debate about the proper role for
normativity in marital property law. In Part I, I begin by ex-
plaining why the question matters-why the law makes any dif-
ference at all to the institution of marriage. Though its role is
surely limited, I suggest ways in which the rules of marital prop-
erty matter, at least on the margin, to marriage itself. In Part II,
I then lay out a schema for what might be meant by a "norma-
tive" marital property regime-describing possible bases on
which the state can set the rules of marital property. Finally, in
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 Carolyn J. Frantz and Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 Colum L Rev 75 (2004).
2 Id at 79 n 9.
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Part III, I attempt to articulate the critique of normativity in
marital property law in light of a clearer understanding of the
possibilities, and the role of the law. I suggest that the question
has a great deal to do with current debates around the right to
marry, made more salient in the same-sex marriage context, and
that commitments made on that basis may translate into views
about how the rules of marital property ought to be crafted. That
is, the best articulation of the critique, I think, is that marriage
is not so much a state-granted benefit to be used by the govern-
ment to achieve its own ends, but rather a deeply personal com-
mitment around which the state should exercise caution in using
its power. The choice to cast marriage in either of these ways has
significance both for state power around the scope of marriage,
as well as for the content of the rules that define it.
I. STATE CONTROL OVER MARITAL PROPERTY RULES
The critique of normativity in marital property rules, as I
will articulate it, ultimately depends on marital property law
making some difference to the institution of marriage itself. It is
therefore essential to make the case that marital property law
matters to marriage, at least to some modest degree. If the mari-
tal property law makes no difference in the actual lives of
spouses, many (though perhaps not all') would dismiss as purely
academic or even wholly irrelevant the inquiry into which laws
to impose. To get a sense of why the marital property law might
matter in this context, I begin by specifying various types of legal
regulation of marital property. I then describe why laws are
"sticky" in this context-why spouses might end up being gov-
erned by marital property rules other than those that they might
prefer and, in fact, have the power to choose, either through pre-
nuptial contracting or by opting not to marry at all. Finally, I
discuss the extent to which the state power over the rules of
3 Many debates about "expressivist" theories of law focus on the question of whether what the
law expresses is relevant, regardless of any tangible effects of that expression. Compare Elizabeth S.
Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U Pa L Rev
1503, 1531 (2000) ("If expressive theories are right, state action should be wrong-and unconstitu-
tional, if constitutional law tracks expressive concerns-when it expresses impermissible valuations,
without regard to further concerns about its cultural or material consequences.") with Cass Sunstein, On
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U Pa L Rev 2021, 2047 (1996) (arguing that concern with expres-
sivism apart from attention to consequences "verges on fanaticism"). See also Matthew D. Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U Pa L Rev 1363 (2000) (highlighting that
some expressivists might find reason to be concerned about the content of the law even if it had no
effect on actual outcomes).
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marital property-which operate almost entirely upon divorce-
may impact marriages even while they last.
A. Ways of Regulating Marital Property
The state usually regulates marital property by means of di-
vorce: how property is divided and support is awarded when
marriages end is the primary and most obvious way in which the
state operates on marital property as a distinct form.4 There are
reasonably few (though there are certainly some) special rules
about the governance and disposition of marital property be-
tween spouses who remain married.5 In general, however, ordi-
nary background rules of property operate between spouses, just
as they do between any other two people. In non-community
property states, the spouse who is the record owner of the prop-
erty may manage and dispose of the property just as if he were
unmarried.6 In community property states, management of
spousal property is much more complex, but even then the direct
operation of the law on spousal transactions is exceedingly rare.8
The rarity of legal intervention in marital property arrange-
ments in community property and non-community property
states is reinforced by the operation of the doctrine of marital
privacy-court reluctance to intervene in disputes over property
between spouses while they are married for fear of improperly
intervening in their intimate relationship.9 The law operates on
marriages through both special marital property rules and ordi-
nary background rules, both at the end of marriage and (to a
lesser extent) while the marriage lasts. As with all forms of legal
regulation, the rules governing marital property can be either
mandatory or optional. The law's provisions can read immutable
mandatory terms into the marital provisions, or they can operate
as mere defaults, filling in blanks where spouses have failed to
privately resolve the relevant issues.
4 Frantz and Dagan, 104 Colum L Rev at 76 (cited in note 1).
5 Id at 124-25.
6 See J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, 56
Law & Contemp Probs 99, 100 and n 2 (1993).
7 Consider id.
8 See Frantz and Dagan, 104 Colum L Rev at 126 (cited in note 1) (noting generally that the need
for judicial involvement is rare "within functioning marriages").
9 See Oldham, 56 Law & Comtemp Probs at 116-18 (cited in note 6) (describing the operation of
the doctrine of marital privacy in community property and non-community property states). For discus-
sion and critique, see Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordina-
tion and the Role of Law, in David Kairys, ed, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 117, 121
(Pantheon 1982).
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A large proportion of marital property rules are defaults: the
law leaves some room for spouses to contract around provisions
for the division of property on divorce and for the governance of
marital property during marriage. Spouses may generally desig-
nate the proportions in which their property will be divided, as
well as which specific items will be included or excluded for the
marital estate, and decide for themselves whether spousal main-
tenance (also called alimony) will be available.'" They may also,
at least sometimes, alter the rules surrounding the governance of
property during their ongoing marriage." These significant rules
thus technically operate only as defaults.
Spouses' power to order their own marital property ar-
rangements, however, are bounded by several mandatory provi-
sions in the law-immutable terms in the marital contract. For
instance, following the doctrine of marital privacy, some courts
will not enforce private agreements relating to the governance of
property during marriage. There are also serious restrictions on
the enforceability of private agreements about child support.'3
And other public policy-based restrictions limit spouses' contrac-
tual freedom: for instance, spouses' ability to change the rules of
marital property may not extend to changing them in such a way
as to burden state public assistance programs."
Most significantly, however, the state does not allow spouses
to alter the terms of marital property in ways deemed uncon-
scionable." The notion of unconscionability is complex, contain-
ing both procedural and substantive components. Unconscion-
ability may serve simply as a way of protecting against serious
procedural problems-for instance, to invalidate contracts most
likely made under conditions of coercion or duress.'6 If uncon-
10 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 3(a)(3) & (4) (West 2001).
11 Id at § 3(a)(1) & (2).
12 Compare Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 Rutgers L Rev 1059,
1071-72 (1988) (describing the impact of the doctrine of marital privacy on terms contemplating altera-
tions of rules of ongoing marriage) with Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis L
Rev 1443, 1460-61 (describing the trend towards greater recognition of private ordering, even with
respect to ongoing marriages).
13 See, for example, Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 3(b) (cited in note 10) (disallowing
premarital contracts that affect child support). Agreements reached at the time of separation regarding
child support are more often enforced, however, even though in theory they are subject to the same
scrutiny. See Brian Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 Fain L Q 255, 269 n 56 (2002)
(recognizing this phenomenon).
14 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 3(a)(8) (cited in note 10) (disallowing contracts in viola-
tion of public policy), § 6(b) (disallowing contracts modifying support in such a way as to make a
spouse eligible for public assistance).
15 Id at § 6(a)(2).
16 See Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va L Rev
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scionability serves merely as a tool for safeguarding the actual
consent of contracting parties, it does not provide an immutable
restriction on the actual content of contracts: parties may reach
whatever substantive conclusions they prefer, as long as they
adopt a proper procedure-including, potentially, such require-
ments as disclosing the proper information to each other with
sufficient time, and maybe even legal representation, to make a
genuine choice. 7
But unconscionability may also, at times, operate as a way of
protecting against certain undesirable or unfair substantive out-
comes, regardless of the nature of the procedure used to reach
them. For instance, a jurisdiction might invalidate a contract
that allocated marital property between spouses in a way that
seemed unfair, even if the means by which the agreement was
reached met procedural standards.'8 This more aggressive use of
the unconscionability doctrine has most likely appeared with
greater frequency in the marital context than it has in other con-
texts.'" Though the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, adopted
by about half of the states, contains both a procedural (in the
form of fair notice of the other spouse's assets) and a substantive
component," a significant number of states continue to follow
their common law heritage of scrutinizing the substantive fair-
ness of actual outcomes, regardless of procedure.' When states
1225, 1257 (1998) (describing unconscionability as a mechanism for invalidating contracts in the
absence of "free, informed, and rational choice"). Consider Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J L & Econ 293, 303-05 (1975) (arguing that a procedural unconscionability
doctrine is a useful tool in limited circumstances).
17 See Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 6(a)(2) (cited in note 10). This is not to suggest that
the proper scope of unconscionability in the protection of procedural fairness is uncontroversial. See,
for example, Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U Pa
L Rev 485 (1967) (arguing that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code's unconscionability
provision fundamentally misunderstood the distinction between procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency,
46 Hastings L J 459, 472-73 (1995) (noting the debate over whether procedural fairness is necessary
when the contract is substantively fair).
18 See, for example, Button v Button, 388 NW2d 546, 551-52 (Wis 1986) (contracts may be in-
validated due to substantive unfairness); Gross v Gross, 464 NE2d 500 (Ohio 1984) (holding that
prenuptial agreements are invalid if they do not meet general fairness tests).
19 Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw U L Rev 65, 74-
75 (1998) (observing both a "recent acceptance" of prenuptial agreements and a "more stringent"
unconscionability standard used in reviewing them); Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The
Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev
145, 158 (1998) ("[There is] [a]n almost even split among the jurisdictions [ ] on the procedural and
substantive fairness elements of [antenuptial] agreements, with the slight majority probably willing to
enforce with few or no requirements on those elements.").
20 See Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 6(a)(2) (cited in note 10).
21 See Silbaugh, 93 Nw U L Rev at 75-76 (cited in note 19) (remarking that only a minority of
states have begun to move away from "thick reviews of substance").
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use unconscionability in such a purely substantive way, the
avoidance of certain ostensibly unfair arrangements can be seen
as an immutable term in the marital property arrangement be-
22tween spouses.
B. The Stickiness of Legal Rules
The state, both by setting default rules that spouses can al-
ter through private contract, and by establishing immutable
marital obligations, exercises a significant amount of power over
the disposition of marital property. Even given the availability of
private order, the legal rules surrounding issues of marital prop-
erty tend to stick-that is, whether or not spouses would actually
choose these rules in a situation of perfect choice, they end up
with them.
1. Immutable rules.
The power the government exercises by adopting mandatory
rules is quite obvious-these rules of marital property apply to
all spouses and cannot be altered by private contract. Whether or
not spouses wish to be bound by them, they will be.
The conclusion seems too obvious to state, but even the
power of immutable state rules of marital property is not per-
fectly straightforward. For those immutable rules triggered only
by the decision to marry, they are not immutable in one crucial
way: one can always alter them by simply choosing not to marry.
This does not reach the entire class of immutable obligations
that apply to spouses-for instance, restrictions on private con-
tracting around child support apply to unmarried, as well as
married parents,23 and hence cannot be circumscribed by avoid-
ing marriage. But some immutable obligations only apply to
married people. The doctrine of marital privacy's restriction on
enforcement of governance contracts during marriage provides
one clear example. Courts in some jurisdictions sometimes do not
allow spouses to make private contractual arrangements for how
their property will be managed and disposed of during marriage,
22 Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doc-
trines, 60 U Chi L Rev 1, 19 n 35 (1993) (describing this sort of substantive unconscionability as pro-
viding an "inalienable entitlement").
23 Consider Catherine Wimberly, Note, Deadbeat Dads, Welfare Moms, and Uncle Sam: How the
Child Support Recovery Act Punishes Single-Mother Families, 53 Stan L Rev 729 (2000) (arguing that
the Child Support Recovery Act uses enforcement of child support obligations against biological fa-
thers to restrict the choices of single mothers on welfare with respect to supporting their children).
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but do not show a similar reluctance to enforce governance con-
tracts in ongoing nonmarital relationships.24
More generally, requirements around substantive uncon-
scionability in the marital context look significantly different
from substantive unconscionability rules that apply to people
who are not married. Marriage triggers an automatic court de-
termination of divorce outcomes, oftentimes explicitly based on
what is fair or equitable. 5 The operation of court determinations
of equity may only be avoided through a contract that will, itself,
at least in some jurisdictions, be scrutinized for fairness in light
of assumptions of what spouses owe to each other.26 Unmarried
couples, by contrast, more frequently must find their way into
obligations with each other, taking on such obligations to one
other only through explicit agreement or, in some states, by
demonstrating substantial unfairness though reference to vari-
ous restitutionary doctrines." This significant difference in struc-
ture reflects the differential incidence of immutable obligations
of sharing and support between married and unmarried persons.
Does the fact that couples may "contract around" these im-
mutable marriage-specific obligations by refusing to enter into
the marriage contract itself matter? Randy Barnett has argued
that immutable rules need not translate into state control over
contracts. Barnett notes that the presence of immutable contract
terms poses no significant challenge to his libertarian individual
consent-based theory of contractual obligation, so long as suffi-
cient competition exists among contracting regimes. 8 Speaking
generally about commercial contracting, Barnett argues:
If meaningful competition among legal systems existed,
commercial parties would choose those legal systems that
offer them the best overall package of default and immu-
table rules. Under these conditions, a general consent to
be legally bound .. .might be construed as including a
24 See, for example, Donovan v Scuderi, 443 A2d 121 (Md 1982) (finding a contract between
cohabitants is not void as against public policy); Kozlowski v Kozlowski, 403 A2d 902 (NJ 1979) (find-
ing that agreements between cohabitants are enforceable when not based on marriage or the promise to
marry); Poe v Estate of Levy, 411 S2d 253 (Fla App 1982) (holding that a cohabitant may enforce an
express support contract against decedent's heirs).
2 See, for example, NC Gen Stat § 50-20(0 (1987).
26 See text accompanying notes 15-22.
27 These restitutionary doctrines include unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. For a general
description and discussion of current practice, see Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution
177-96 (Cambridge 2003).
28 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va L Rev
821, 902-05 (1992).
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general consent even to those immutable rules that one
cannot contract around.29
Similarly, if being married and not being married were in mean-
ingful competition, with spouses freely choosing between them
based on the desirability of the associated immutable rules, there
would be little if any state power associated with immutability
within the purely optional marriage context.
Marriage clearly does not operate in this way. Couples are
not neutral between marriage and non-marriage, choosing each
based on the merits of the legal obligations thereby entailed. At
the very least, there is substantial social pressure to marry."
Surely many couples marry because they believe others expect
them to, or because of their own desire to engage in a symbolic
act with personal meaning, rather than because they choose to
openly endorse the legal terms of the institution. Data also sug-
gests that couples are reasonably ignorant of the legal conse-
quences of their decision to marry, making the view of marriage
as embodying a personal preference for legal consequences even
more implausible." Given this, one can view the immutable rules
of property attached to marriage as the government exercising
power by free riding on another social phenomenon. Because
couples' decisions to marry remain relatively insensitive to the
content of legal rules, the state can manipulate the situation and
power to impose its own desired rules upon married couples.
Moreover, even if couples did make the marriage/non-
marriage choice purely based on rational preferences between
the relevant legal regimes, the market of legal benefits and bur-
dens presented to them is not a particularly robust one. There
are some legal benefits to being married-those relating to the
immigration and tax laws being among the most frequently dis-
cussed-that cannot be obtained through private contracting.
Given such a limited market, the government exercises power by
bundling these goods together: in order to receive other benefits
29 Id at 905.
30 See, for example, Rhona Mahoney, Kidding Ourselves: Breadwinning, Babies, and Bargaining
Power 67-73 (Basic Books 1996) (describing some of the causes and effects of this implicit pressure to
marry).
31 Lynn A. Baker and Robert E. Emery, Where Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L & Human Beh 439, 441 (1993) (finding,
among marriage license applicants, a knowledge of the divorce law "only slightly better than chance").
32 See, for example, Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incen-
tives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S Cal L Rev 745, 786 (1995) (noting tax deductions and
prison visitation rights as benefits available only through marriage).
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gained solely through marriage, spouses accept immutable terms
relating to marital property that they would not otherwise
choose.
2. Default rules.
The state's power over the content of marital property rules
does not limit itself to immutable rules: the choice of default
rules also has a significant effect on marital relationships. In all
contractual contexts, the government's choice of default rules
matters to the arrangements finally reached. Two primary rea-
sons indicate why defaults make a difference.
First, the choice of default rules has an impact on the results
ultimately reached, by changing the costs of striking, or not
striking, particular deals. Most obviously, default rules place the
transaction costs of private contracting on those who prefer a
different outcome.3 The effect of default rules on costs may also
be more complex. Rather than simply making it more expensive
to reach any solution other than the default provided for in the
law, default rules may, for instance, be designed to give particu-
lar parties incentives to reveal information, thus altering the
contracts that will likely be formed.' For instance, Dagan and I
have argued that a default rule of equal sharing has the desir-
able effect of forcing a spouse who prefers more independence in
the relationship to reveal that preference. 5 However they oper-
ate, the government's choice of default rules does significantly
affect the actual outcomes reached between private parties. Yet,
acknowledging the state's power to impact outcomes through the
setting of default rules does not indicate how the state will use
this power. The state could choose to intentionally set default
rules to facilitate contractors' preferences, thus minimizing the
impact of the power of the state in setting default rules. This sort
of facilitative default rule regime is, in fact, precisely what the
critique of normatively based marital property rules, which I dis-
cuss in the next Part, recommends. But for now, it is simply im-
portant to note the power of the state to set default rules in all
contractual contexts.
33 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L Rev 608,
613-17 (1998) (describing the interaction between default rules and transaction costs).
34 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 91 (1989) (introducing the concept of "penalty default" rules designed
for information-forcing purposes).
35 See Frantz and Dagan, 104 Colum L Rev at 97 n 92 (cited in note 1).
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Second, default rules matter to actual outcomes because
they may play a role in shaping the actual preferences of con-
tracting parties. Russell Korobkin has referred to this as a
"status quo bias"-that (in addition to the desire to avoid the
transaction costs of contracting away from the default rules pro-
vided), whether through habit, persuasion, or any other reason,
contractors may simply come to prefer the outcomes represented
by the defaults. 6 Preference-endogeneity may also make default
rules sticky, thus making the state's choice of rules a significant
source of power.
The state's general power to set default rules in all contrac-
tual contexts is significantly heightened in the marital context.
The incidence of private contracting around the terms of mar-
riage is markedly low-around 5 percent.7 As I have already ar-
gued, the limited state of knowledge about the content of the le-
gal rules surrounding marriage and divorce make it highly
unlikely that the stickiness of the marital property defaults re-
flects genuine spousal preferences for the content of the rules."
It seems very likely that the transaction costs of contracting
around marital defaults are particularly high. First, there are
potential interpersonal costs: a future spouse could perceive a
request to sign a prenuptial agreement as a signal of lack of
commitment to, or optimism about, the impending marriage.
Spouses may also have difficulty with properly assessing the im-
portance of the contractual terms governing their divorce-at
least two studies have shown significant irrationalities in indi-
viduals' assessments of their own chances of divorce." This irra-
36 Consider Korobkin, 83 Cornell L Rev 608 (cited in note 33) (arguing that contractors prefer
default rules as part of their general preference for the status quo).
37 See Frantz and Dagan, 104 Colum L Rev at 80 n 12 (cited in note 1).
38 SeePart IB 1.
39 Consider Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements?, Olin Center Discus-
sion Paper No. 436 (2003), available online at <http://www.law.harvard.edulprograms/olin-center/
papers/pdf/436.pdf> (visited May 17, 2004) (finding support for the theory that false optimism and
negative signaling effects explain the tendency to forgo prenuptial agreements); Baker and Emery, 17 L
& Human Beh at 448 (cited in note 31) (speculating that the systematic optimism of young adults about
the likelihood of divorce may explain the scarcity of prenuptial agreements); Saul Levmore, Norms as
Supplements, 86 Va L Rev 1989, 2021 (2000) (arguing that raising the subject of prenuptial agreements
signals distrust because there is no norm of entering into such agreements).
This effect has been called an "attitudinal negotiation cost." See Edward A. Bernstein, Law &
Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law &
Economics Literature, 74 Or L Rev 189, 229, 232 (1995).
40 See Baker and Emery, 17 L & Human Beh at 446 (cited in note 31) (finding a large discrepancy
between individuals' accurate perceptions about the likelihood of divorce in the overall population and
overly optimistic assessments of their own likelihood of divorce); Mahar, Why Are There So Few
Prenuptial Agreements? at 15-16 (cited in note 39) (finding that respondents' underestimation of their
own chances of divorce was pervasive and significant).
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tionality may make spouses, either before or during the mar-
riage, unlikely to try to protect their interests upon divorce
through private contract, even where the costs of not doing so
exceed the benefits.
C. State Power over Marriage
That the legal rules surrounding marital property exhibit a
significant degree of stickiness seems beyond serious dispute.
But the actual rules surrounding marital property are of rela-
tively limited importance. They generally only directly operate
upon property when, and if, spouses decide to divorce. Given this
limitation, what impact do the rules of marital property have on
the nature of the institution of marriage itself? What difference
does the law make regarding how couples actually organize their
property while they are married, and, more generally, with re-
spect to how they view the attachment they have?
There is, rather obviously, no clear answer to these ques-
tions. Let me suggest, however, some ways in which the law
might make a difference. Most directly, even though the rules of
marital property operate almost entirely upon divorce, spouses
considering how to order their behavior during marriage might
take into account the effects that this behavior would have on
their property settlement in the event of divorce. For instance,
rules about the transmutation of separate property (the turning
of separate property into marital property during a marriage)
might, on the margins, give spouses reasons not to share or com-
bine certain assets.41 To the degree this occurs, the sticky marital
property rules provided by the state would matter to the conduct
of individual marriages. There may also be a more indirect effect.
The rules of marital property might send a social message about
the nature of marriage itself that could become incorporated into
the meaning of the institution, thus shaping the behavior of pre-
sent and future couples. 2 For instance, community property
rules, emphasizing sharing in marriage, might make couples
reconceptualize their marriages as more communal.43
41 See J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 Fam L Q 219, 246-47
(1989) (describing the transmutation by use doctrine, "which punishes generous spouses" and rewards
"[s]pouses who hoard," by transforming separate property used by both spouses into marital property).
42 See Frantz and Dagan, 104 Colum L Rev at 94-98 (cited in note 1) (discussing the role of the
law in marriage generally).
43 Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 Cal L Rev 1517, 1542 (2003) (observing the expres-
sive significance of community property).
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The significance of both of these effects probably remains
relatively small. As to the first direct effect, limited spousal
knowledge of the likelihood of divorce (not to mention the fact
that, for many spouses, the likelihood of divorce is in fact low),
and a lack of knowledge about the content of the rules of the
marital property law," make serious rational consideration of the
effects on marital behavior of post-divorce legal outcomes seem
unlikely. Lack of knowledge about the content of the marital
property law must also affect the expressive power of the law: in
particular, the minute and technical details of the marital prop-
erty law seem very unlikely to influence social understanding of
the institution.
The law's effect on marriage must also be limited for another
reason-generally in life, but particularly in marriage, the law
must compete for attention with a large number of other impor-
tant and deeply held commitments. Cultural and religious forces,
social conventions, romantic love-these influences and many
others impact the meaning of the institution of marriage and in-
fluence spouses' choices within individual marriages. The law, if
it is to make a difference, must find its place among a range of
powerful forces.
For all of these reasons, any claim that the law acts as a
primary determinant of the nature of the institution of marriage
is almost surely false. But it is equally implausible, I think, to
claim that the marital property law makes no difference whatso-
ever in the content of marriages. The law regulating families is
certainly more in the public consciousness than any other area of
the law, except possibly criminal law. News stories and television
shows depict the legal consequences of divorce, and the divorce
rate of about 50 percent45 indicates that a large number of people
either have been divorced or know someone who has been di-
vorced. At least in its broader contours, people do talk about
marital property law.
44 See text accompanying note 31.
45 Rose M. Kreider and Jason M. Fields. Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Di-
vorces: Fall 1996 17-18, in Current Population Reports 70-80 (U.S. Census Bureau Feb 2002), avail-
able online at <http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.pdf> (last visited May 17, 2004) (esti-
mating divorce rate for recent marriages at just under 50 percent).
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II. WAYS OF USING STATE POWER
Given its degree of power, how should the state use it? This
Part outlines potential government agendas for marriage and the
ways in which legal rules might effectively implement them.
A. Spouse-Focused Approaches
1. Facilitating existing spousal preferences.
One possible approach for the state is to use the marital
property law to simply facilitate the actual preferences of
spouses. Much contracts literature focuses on identifying the
46proper rules to achieve this goal for contracting parties.
Actual contracting in the real world is characterized by
transaction costs and other kinds of information and bargaining
failures that can present obstacles to mutual preference-
satisfaction through contract.47 Appropriately designed legal
rules, both immutable and default, can eliminate the effects of
these obstacles to achieving ideal agreements. They aim at ena-
bling parties to reach the agreement that they would reach in a
world without transaction costs and other contracting difficul-
ties.' A facilitative approach to the rules of marital property
would aim at enabling spouses to reach whatever agreement
they would reach in the absence of the significant bargaining
failures associated with marriage.
Facilitative legal rules can take many forms. The most obvi-
ous is that of attempting to mimic the bargain that couples
would strike in the absence of transactional difficulties. 49 These
types of default rules have been called "majoritarian" or "hypo-
thetical," because they generally rely on assessments of the ar-
rangements most contractors (in this case, spouses) would reach
in a hypothetical world with perfect bargaining.5" If the law seeks
46 See, for example, David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 Mich L Rev 1815 (1991) (arguing for an explicit set of default rules to replace the
hypothetical bargain approach to contract interpretation).
47 See id at 1840-47 (describing the obstacles to and the process of applying an instrumental
approach to contract law).
48 Consider id at 1815 (discussing how courts interpret contracts in terms of what the parties
would have bargained for).
49 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan L Rev 1591,
1592 (1999) (noting that majoritarian rules derive from the theory that incomplete contracts result from
high transaction costs).
50 See id (referring to these rules as "hypothetical" or "majoritarian"). Alan Schwartz refers to
such contract terms as "problem-solving." See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the
Limits of Contract Law, 3 S Cal Interdiscipl L J 389, 390 (1993).
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to facilitate spousal preferences, it could attempt to construct
such a hypothetical bargain and replicate its terms in the mari-
tal property law, most likely in terms of default rules that cou-
ples could contract around if their preferences diverged substan-
tially from those of the norm.
Mimicking hypothetical preferences, however, is not the only
option for setting the rules of marital property. As in contracts
more generally, spousal preferences may, in certain circum-
stances, be more effectively facilitated through a more creative
use of the law's power. Penalty default rules, for instance, which
adopt outcomes unpleasant enough for certain contracting par-
ties, thus causing them to reveal crucial information at the bar-
gaining stage, might possibly be employed in the marital context
(though the forces working against premarital contracting might
make this a risky strategy). 1 The state has a broad range of legal
tools available for facilitation of preferences. 2
One strategy for facilitating spousal preferences presents it-
self with particular force in regard to marriage: forced specifica-
tion of terms at the time of marriage. 3 Though this strategy has
some appeal if the state's goal is facilitating preferences (after
all, who better than spouses themselves could know how to facili-
tate their own preferences), like all other legal rules, its effec-
tiveness would have to be evaluated based on actual perform-
ance. The systematic irrationalities and signaling problems that
cause spouses not to write prenuptial agreements in the first
place would almost surely infect their decisionmaking if forced to
write an agreement at the beginning of marriage." Actual bar-
gaining in the marital context is likely to diverge significantly
from ideal bargaining. Though forced contracting is one possible
51 See Ayres and Gertner, Filling Gaps, 99 Yale L J at 91 (cited in note 34) (introducing the
concept of penalty default rule). Henry Smith has suggested a "penalty default" type rule for an inter-
mediate tax-filing system in marriage. See Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation,
72 S Cal L Rev 145, 151-53 (1998).
52 1 am also leaving aside one of the more troubling questions of rule setting: how general rules
may be. That is, when coming up with rules to govern marriage, how well must they take into account
variation among couples? Can there be only one set of marital property rules, or should the government
present several-a menu of options? For a discussion of the generality problem in default rule setting,
see Charny, 89 Mich L Rev at 1840-47 (cited in note 46).
53 Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 Vand L Rev 397, 400 (1992) ("[N]o
change in the law could do more to facilitate private ordering of property and income after divorce than
a requirement that couples choose their own futures."). See also Kaylah Campos Zelig, Note, Putting
Responsibility Back into Marriage: Making a Case for Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U Colo L Rev 1223
(1993).
54 See text accompanying note 39.
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tool to facilitate spousal preferences, and might in fact turn out
to be the most effective, it is not necessarily so.
What might spousal preference-satisfaction look like in cur-
rent marital property law? It is difficult to accurately predict
what spouses would agree to if they could engage in a perfect
bargain. For illustrative purposes in this Article (to contrast with
other approaches), I am going to make a few guesses. Nothing in
particular turns on the accuracy of these guesses, though I have
tried to make them at least plausible. I will focus on two types of
issues, gender equality and the degree of commitment between
spouses.
a) Gender equality. The rules of marital property can
provide more or less support for gender equality within the mari-
tal relationship. Consider, for example, methods of dividing exist-
ing marital property upon divorce. Compared with equal division
norms, division of marital property based on market valuations
of labor within the family are, for instance, almost surely des-
tined to result in women receiving fewer marital resources than
men receive. Given the lower market valuation of "women's
work," only counter-factual assertions of the market value of
household labor are likely to lead to equal divisions based on
market-valued contributions.5 The division of property upon di-
vorce is likely to affect not only the equality of outcomes after the
marriage is over, but also, to some extent, power and decision-
making during the marriage. The spouse who will receive a
greater proportion of the marital goods can more credibly
threaten exit, differentially affecting husbands' and wives' voices
within the marriage itself.56
As Amy Wax has surmised, however, given various back-
ground conditions (wage differentials, differentials in the length
of reproductive life, and social expectations), women may have a
difficult time striking a perfectly gender-egalitarian bargain with
men. Because men have better nonmarital options than women
do, women will have reasons to marry men, even on inegalitarian
55 See Frantz and Dagan, 104 Colum L Rev at 100-06 (cited in note 1).
56 Susan Moiler Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 137-38, 161, 167-68, 180-81 (Basic Books
1989) (describing the relationship between voice and exit, and noting that men are better off and
women less so after divorce). See also June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms
of Community, 31 Houston L Rev 359, 405 (1994) (observing that men's implicit threat of exit has
contributed to women's diminished power within marriage); Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Market: Is There a Fiture for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 Va L Rev 509, 544-51, 626-36 (1998)
(describing the adverse impact of bargaining disparity, partially due to men's exit threat advantage, on
women's choices within marriage).
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terms.57 Given these social conditions, it is plausible that a hypo-
thetical transaction-free bargain between men and women would
not result in a gender-egalitarian marital property law.
b) Degrees of commitment. No-fault, unilateral divorce is
now the virtually universal law of the United States." Divorce
rates remain reasonably high-around 50 percent. 9 Couples pre-
sented with the option of choosing a more restrictive divorce law
through optional marital regimes, like covenant marriage, over-
whelmingly choose not to do so.6° Based on these phenomena, one
could reasonably assume that marrying couples now value a per-
manent commitment less than marrying couples in the past did.
Today's couples may take more seriously the possibility that they
will wish to divorce, and even remarry. The rules of marital
property reflect the degree of permanent commitment of mar-
riage. A legal system that distributes a substantial amount of
post-marital goods from the higher wage-earning spouse to the
other spouse-usually taking the form of alimony-more greatly
reflects a long-term commitment view of marriage than a legal
system that treats the financial relationship between the spouses
as over at the time of divorce (what is often called the "clean
break" philosophy). Given current social understandings of mar-
riage, in striking a hypothetical bargain, we might guess that
spouses would more likely gravitate towards the clean break the-
ory of legal arrangements than a theory that would entail a
greater degree of commitment.
2. Paternalism.
Facilitating existing spousal preferences is not the only
spouse-focused goal that the state might have regarding marital
property. Instead of taking spousal preferences as a given, the
government might attempt, through the rules of marital prop-
57 See Wax, 84 Va L Rev at 551 (cited in note 56) ("Because men generally have better options in
these markets than women, the value of the right to exit from a marriage is on average greater for men
than for women.").
58 Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More
Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 Emory L J 929, 939 (1998) ("[fln 1985, South
Dakota became the fiftieth state to adopt a no-fault divorce law.").
59 Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? at 1 n 3 (cited in note 39) ("Assuming
current rates of marital disruption, 'about 50 percent of first marriages for men under age 45 may end in
divorce, and between 44 and 52 percent of women's first marriages may end in divorce."') (internal
citations omitted).
60 For a general discussion of the merits of covenant marriage, see F. H. Buckley and Larry E.
Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U Ill L Rev 561, 572-75.
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erty, to act somewhat paternalistically. A paternalist agenda
would attempt to enable spouses to reach not the agreement they
would reach in the absence of transaction costs, but to correct
spouses' own understandings of their own welfare." A govern-
ment with a paternalist agenda could utilize the same tools as
the facilitative government-immutable rules, default rules,
forced contracting-but with a different desired endpoint.
I suggest some ways a paternalist agenda might change
marital property rules in the two contexts I have already identi-
fied, gender equality and degree of commitment. Again, I make
no attempt to claim in this Article that either of these arguments
is actually true. They are just arguments that adopt a paternalist
form.
a) Gender equality. Women might not understand the
degree to which inegalitarian marriage challenges their own
autonomy and self-respect and challenges their own well-being.
They may systematically overvalue the marital outcome at the
cost of the equality outcome for any number of reasons-they
may, for instance, overestimate the burdens associated with re-
maining single, or the chance that they will remain unmarried if
they insist upon equality. If women would actually be better off if
they insisted on egalitarian marriages (even if that meant they
sometimes were not able to marry at all), regardless of what they
would prefer, a paternalist spouse-focused marital property law
might be more egalitarian.
b) Degree of commitment. Couples may actually enjoy
having a greater degree of commitment in their relationships
than they realize. Designing the marital property law to provide
for more post-divorce support might send a message about the
value of long-term commitment that would, in the end, decrease
the chances that a particular couple would divorce. Couples may
find that they enjoy remaining married more than they thought
that they would. A paternalist spouse-focused marital property
law might therefore provide for more post-divorce support than
that for which couples would ordinarily contract.
61 Consider Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymo-
ron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159, 1159-67 (2003) (arguing for a "self-conscious" attempt "to steer people's
choices in directions that will improve the choosers' own welfare").
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B. Externalities
1. Concerning currently existing third parties.
The state need not craft legal rules surrounding marital
property simply with the interests of spouses in mind. In particu-
lar, some of the immutable rules of marriage appear to have been
crafted with an eye to the externalities inherent in the disposi-
tion of marital property. Private marriages may have effects both
on particular third parties, such as children, and on taxpayers in
general, through the state.62 In my two contexts, the impact of
the law on presently existing third parties might influence the
setting of the marital property law in some of the following ways.
a) Gender equality. As Amy Wax has pointed out, insist-
ing on gender equality in marital property rules might ultimately
result in fewer marriages.63 If marriage benefits children (if, that
is, children whose parents marry have better lives) or the gov-
ernment (people who marry may be more productive workers, for
instance, or be generally less likely to rely on the state for sup-
port),64 then the government may wish to make marriage less
egalitarian, in order to make it more frequent. A focus on exter-
nalities would allow the state to consider this type of third-party
claim when establishing the rules of marital property.
b) Degree of commitment. Similar factors that would
cause the government to encourage more, rather than fewer,
marriages, might also lead it to adopt rules that make marital
commitments more serious, discouraging divorce among those
who have already married (although if Wax is right that restric-
tive rules might make fewer people marry in the first place, then
the strength of the effect is not at all clear). If lower rates of di-
vorce benefit the government or children, and more future-
directed support would lead to lower rates of divorce, then an
externality-focused government might wish to adopt more com-
mitment-oriented marital property rules.
62 See, for example, NJ Stat Ann § 2A:34-23(g) (West 1999) ("In all actions for divorce.., where
judgment is granted on the ground of institutionalization for mental illness the court may consider the
possible burden upon the taxpayers of the State as well as the ability of the party to pay in determining
an amount of maintenance to be awarded.").
63 Wax, 84 Va L Rev at 658-59 (cited in note 56)
64 All of these claims are made, in great detail, online at <http://www.marriagemovement.org/>
(last visited May 17, 2004).
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2. Concerning future spouses.
The universe of possible externalities to consider in crafting
the marital property law is potentially much broader than just
these reasonably straightforward examples. For instance, to the
extent that marital property law may have longer-term impacts
on the institution of marriage itself, there may be effects of the
marital property law on future generations of spouses.65 The exis-
tence of this kind of externality most likely depends on the law
having an expressive effect on the nature of the institution into
the future. The state might have a goal of changing the institu-
tion of marriage so that, in the future, spouses might have a
greater degree of preference-satisfaction. It might choose to pur-
sue this goal even at the expense of the preference-satisfaction of
current spouses. Consider the possible impact of such a goal
(whether correctly or incorrectly translated into concrete recom-
mendations) in the two contexts I have identified.
a) Gender equality. Though it may serve the interests of
current spouses to strike an inegalitarian marital bargain, if we
created egalitarian rules of marriage, the institution of marriage
may, over time, change. If the state sets an example of egalitari-
anism, more spouses might come to prefer egalitarianism (either
on its own terms, or because it has good subsidiary effects, like a
deeper marital bond). As more marriages become egalitarian, the
world may change to better enable this sort of marriage-social
norms around childrearing may change, for instance, and per-
haps employment requirements would be altered to better allow
for joint responsibility for raising children. Once those changes
have been made, egalitarian marriages will become more feasible
for a larger number of couples, who will derive a greater satisfac-
tion from them than they would have from the inegalitarian ar-
rangement couples would now reach. But to make that change,
couples now must suffer a diminution in their preference-
satisfaction. Taking into account potential benefits to future gen-
erations of spouses might therefore diverge from the interests
(even paternalistically defined) of present spouses.
65 How precisely to take into account the interests of future generations, even under welfarist
assumptions, is controversial. See, for example, Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environ-
mental Law and Future Generations, 2003 U Ill L Rev 289 (describing the difficulty of using econom-
ics to correctly value our obligations with respect to future generations).
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b) Degree of commitment. A similar story could arise re-
garding the degree of commitment in marriages. It may be that
marriages would be more satisfying if people felt that divorce
offered a lesser option. But the message about the value of com-
mitment sent by future-directed property obligations might take
a few generations to fully take hold. In the interim, spouses
would have more future-directed obligations than they would
like, without getting enough of the offsetting benefit that the
eventually greater degree of marital commitment would provide.
C. "Pure" Normativity
A final option is that the government might attempt to use
the rules of marital property to make marriages morally better,
without a necessary increase (and possibly even with a decrease)
in the satisfaction, or even paternalistically defined welfare, of
current spouses or third parties. This of course presupposes a
moral system that operates irrespective of preference-satisfaction
or even paternalistic welfare-enhancement of current spouses or
third parties. But plenty of moral systems take just that form-
relying on a theory of the good that is, at least in some aspects,
separate from spousal welfare.6 If the government held such a
moral theory, it might take the following stances, and set marital
property law accordingly.
a) Gender equality. It is certainly easy to imagine a
moral claim that looks like the following: Inegalitarian mar-
riages are subordinating to women, and as such (under any
number of moral or political theories), they are wrong and unfair.
The marital property law therefore ought to insist upon (or at
least push for) egalitarianism through equal division and other
egalitarian norms.
66 One possibility for coming up with a normatively appealing stance towards marriage, for in-
stance, would be to employ a Rawlsian hypothetical bargain type of framework-what spouses would
agree to if they did not know in advance which position they would have in the marriage. This sort of
hypothetical bargain is, I take it, the basis of the Scotts' approach to the good marriage. Consider Scott
and Scott, 84 Va L Rev 1225 (cited in note 16).
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b) Degree of commitment. As a free-standing moral mat-
ter, one might think that spouses ought to be at least encouraged
to keep the moral commitments they make through marriage. As
significant post-divorce asset sharing fulfills those obligations, it
should be made an immutable, or at least a default, rule.
The stances the government might take when crafting mari-
tal property rules are thus widely varied, and much more nu-
anced than the normative/facilitative dichotomy would suggest.
At the very least, marital property rules motivated by what I
have called "pure" normativity ought to be considered normative,
and either actual facilitation of spousal desires, or some pater-
nalistic correction thereof, ought to be considered facilitative.
The question of where to put consideration of externalities of
various types is complex, and first requires a fuller articulation
of the critique against normativity in the marital property rule
setting context.
III. THE CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVITY IN THE RULES OF
MARITAL PROPERTY
A critique of normativity in the context of marital property
rules might assume any number of forms. Some may deny the
existence of "pure" normativity altogether-they deny that there
are moral claims separate from satisfaction of the preferences, or
interests, of present or future persons." Setting rules based on
that category of concern, therefore, would be nonsensical rather
than illegitimate. Or objections might be more practical-that
whatever goals the state can justifiably pursue, it cannot practi-
cally achieve them through the tool of marital property-that
marital property law is too remote from people's actual mar-
riages to make any difference."
Some might also have more general objections to the use of
the law to achieve particular types of goals, objections that are
not specific to the marital context. Libertarians, for instance,
might be skeptical of purely normative legislation, as well as pa-
ternalism and some protection of third-party interests, because
of their interference with individual autonomy." Others may find
67 This would be a standard view of utilitarians. Consider Shelley Kagan, Normative Ethics 61-62
(Westview 1998).
68 See Part I C.
69 See, for example, Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 163 (Harvard 1978) ("[I]n the pursuit of
fairness, of positive right, lawmakers may not themselves violate negative rights, not even as a means
to the end that others respect negative rights.").
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reasons to be skeptical of state attempts to pursue moral agen-
das, even if they do not have a general libertarian perspective. °
All of these questions are too grand for me to even begin to
address in this Article, although the answers to them will obvi-
ously impact the ways in which the state should set marital
property rules. I want to turn instead to a very particular criti-
cism-a criticism unique to marriage. I believe it captures the
intuitions of many of the critics of normatively based marital
property rules, and it is worthy of separate consideration.71
The marriage-specific critique of normatively based marital
property rules, as I understand it, goes to the very heart of the
nature of marriage itself. Marriage is a deeply private intimate
attachment, but also a creature of the state. If one views mar-
riage as a private relationship, there is reason to be reluctant
about state attempts at normativity. If one views marriage as a
state institution, however, state agenda-pushing seems consid-
erably less controversial. So which, or which combination of the
two, is marriage? The argument for a non-normatively based
marital property regime can be articulated as a form of preferred
government non-interference in private relationships. Because
marriage is a private, intimate thing, the argument goes, the
government has no business attempting to manipulate marriage
based on its own views of what a "good" marriage looks like. To
the extent that the government must do something about the
division of marital property, it should strive, insofar as possible,
merely to facilitate what spouses want, rather than to push what
the government wishes that they would do. This would minimize
governmental intrusion into the state institution of marriage.
Putting aside for now the ambiguity in exactly which meth-
ods of marital property rule setting this critique would endorse
or reject, is there anything to be said for this notion of the par-
ticular importance of non-interference in marriage? The idea
that the state should avoid interfering in some private decisions
is of course not a novel one. There is a constitutional tradition,
echoed by the recent Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v
Texas,72 striking down a criminal ban on consensual sodomy, re-
quiring state non-interference in intimate matters. The birth
70 See, for example, Schwartz, 3 S Cal Interdiscipl L J at 392 (cited in note 50) (arguing that "the
state should not create normative or transformative default rules at all").
71 See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv
L Rev 1497, 1504 (1983) ("The idea that the state should not intrude upon the family has, for most
people today, a great deal more appeal than does classical laissez-faire economics.").
72 123 S Ct 2472 (2003).
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control cases, Eisenstadt v Baird" and Griswold v Connecticut,74
along with the abortion cases, particularly Roe v Wade75 and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey," ex-
hibit a constitutional command to keep some private things pri-
vate.
Exactly what private things must constitutionally exist out-
side the regulation of the state, of course, remains a matter of
significant confusion. After Lawrence, does it make the most
sense to conclude that the Court has (without putting things ex-
actly this way) recognized a right to engage in recreational sex
without reproductive consequences?" Or perhaps the principle
has a different scope-providing a right not so much to the
physical acts, but to the particular sort of relationships thereby
characterized? There are some indications of a more relationship-
focused view in Lawrence. Justice Kennedy associated the pro-
tection of sodomy with the creation of relationships that have
emotional content: "When sexuality finds overt expression in in-
timate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring."
7 8
Constitutional concerns around relationship formation can
also be seen in the enigmatic "right to marry." On several occa-
sions, the Court has recognized the existence of such a right. In
Loving v Virginia,9 which invalidated restrictions on interracial
marriage, the Court declared:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the "basic civil
rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and
survival."
73 405 US 438 (1972).
74 381 US 479 (1965).
75 410 US 113 (1973).
76 505 US 833 (1992).
77 See Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and "That" in Lawrence v Texas, 2004 S Ct Rev at 32-35
(forthcoming). For a pre-Lawrence interpretation favoring a right to recreational sex, see Richard D.
Mohr, Mr. Justice Douglas at Sodom: Gays and Privacy, 18 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 43, 80-82 (1986).
Compare with David B. Cruz, The Sexual Freedom Cases? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and
the Constitution, 35 Harv CR-CL L Rev 299 (2000) (rejecting an interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent that would establish a right to have intimate sexual relations).
78 Lawrence, 123 S Ct at 2478. See also Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Tolera-
tion: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 Cal L Rev 521, 534 (1989) (making a similar argument about
enduring homosexual relationships pre-Lawrence).
79 388 US 1 (1967).
80 Id at 12.
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In Boddie v Connecticut,"1 which required states to allow indigent
persons to obtain a divorce without paying filing fees and court
costs, the Court noted the implications for difficult divorce pro-
ceedings on the right to marry (and particularly, in that context,
re-marry).82 In Zablocki v Redhail," which invalidated restric-
tions on marriage of persons delinquent in their child support
obligations, the Court explained the right thus:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been
placed on the same level of importance as decisions relat-
ing to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family re-
lationships. ... [I]t would make little sense to recognize a
right to privacy with respect to other matters of family life
and not with respect to the decision to enter the relation-
ship that is the foundation of the family in our society.8'
Finally, in Turner v Safley,"5 the Court relied on the right to
marry, when it invalidated restrictions on marriage by prisoners,
based in part on the importance to private relationships of ex-
pressing "emotional support and public commitment." 6
The Court's recognition of the right to marry suggests a
principle of constitutional protection for intimate relationships
more generally, beyond their sexual and reproductive compo-
nents. The right to marry suggests a broader interest in organiz-
ing one's intimate personal attachments as one wishes. The right
to marry itself only directly controls entry into marriage (and
how far it extends will certainly be the subject of much debate, as
same-sex marriage issues work their way further into public, and
judicial, consciousness). But might the concept also apply to the
legal rules that affect the content of marriages once they are
formed? If so, this might ground a claim that the rules of marital
property (at least insofar as they actually affect ongoing mar-
riages)87 should be as non-obtrusive as possible-to facilitate the
sorts of marriages spouses want (or at least those marriages that
are good for them), rather than attempt to shape marriages on
the basis of some other criterion.
81 401 US 371 (1971).
82 Id at 376-77.
83 434 US 374 (1978).
84 Id at 386.
85 482 US 78 (1987).
86 Id at 95.
87 See text accompanying notes 4-11.
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The doctrine of marital privacy-the idea that the state
should not interfere to resolve ordinary disputes between spouses
in an ongoing marriage-can be seen as an example within mar-
riage of the "hands-off" approach taken in the right to marry.88 In
addition to remaining agnostic about who should marry, the doc-
trine of marital privacy suggests that the state should also refuse
to take a position on how couples ought to organize their lives
once they are married. This position has been greatly criticized,
though it remains a force in American family law jurisprudence.
Largely gone are the days when the doctrine of marital privacy
allowed physical violence in the marital home,89 but courts are
still reluctant to resolve disputes about property allocation be-
tween currently married spouses.
An argument against certain kinds of agenda-pushing in
marital property law might look somewhat similar to the doc-
trine of marital privacy: both are based on a common idea of the
state staying out of the content of functioning marriages. There
is one large structural difference, however, between the two dif-
ferent approaches of being hands-off about marriage. The doc-
trine of marital privacy involves the state actually refraining
from acting on a range of questions presented to it during mar-
riage.0 Marital privacy-respecting rules governing marital prop-
erty, by contrast, involve more clearly affirmative government
action-the setting of particular methods of deciding property
division and support upon divorce.
In a sense, however, this difference is more real than it is
apparent. As critiques of marital privacy have long noted, judi-
cial non-interference in intra-marital disputes does not actually
represent a hands-off approach to the functioning of marriages
as much as it represents a particular kind of state control over
marriage. What the doctrine of marital privacy actually does is
leave spouses at the mercy of background legal rules that allo-
cate control over marital goods and decisionmaking9
Marital privacy-based restrictions on the content of marital
property rules have the potential to be more neutral in actual
substance than they currently are. If the state made efforts to set
88 See text accompanying note 9.
89 See Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L J
2117, 2118 (1996) (noting that domestic abuse persists even though feminist challenges to the use of
marital privacy to shield domestic violence have resulted in widespread legal reforms).
90 See text accompanying notes 23-24.
91 See Olsen, 96 Harv LRev at 1504-07, 1509-13 (cited in note 71).
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the legal rules around marriage to best approximate what
spouses actually want, it might result in more autonomy-
respecting than any formal rules requiring non-intervention in
marital affairs. I have already made this point with respect to
suggestions that the most marital privacy-respecting form of
regulation for marital property would be a regime that requires
spouses to privately contract for the marital property rules that
will apply to them.92 While such a regime might seem, in form, to
embody less state intrusion in marriage, whether it will substan-
tively do a better or worse job of giving spouses what they want
without state interference is an open question.93
Questing after substantive, rather than formal, neutrality in
the rules of marital property, however, complicates matters sig-
nificantly. Which of the approaches that I have described above'
counts as substantively neutral? The last category-the most.
purely normative approach-would almost certainly appear, to
any critic, as the state attempting to impose its own views of
marriage on couples. Some version of the spouse-centric goal-
more or less paternalistic-would surely qualify as the state
staying out of marriage.
Consideration of externalities is more complex. In contracts
literature more generally, rules designed to avoid negative ex-
ternalities are typically seen as justified when there is no good
way for the parties on whom the externalities fall to protect
themselves.94 At least as to harms to children, and perhaps also
to future generations of spouses or to the state, this may be true
in the context of marital property rules. But there is genuine
room for debate about the extent to which externalities-and
particular types of externalities-are on or off limits when the
government sets out to regulate private conduct.9" Surely the fact
that people may be offended (a negative externality, at least of a
sort) by the property arrangement one might wish to strike with
one's spouse should not be a motivating force, if the idea of mar-
riage as a protected private attachment makes any sense at all.
But is the same thing true for the interests of vulnerable chil-
92 SeePart IIA 1.
93 See text accompanying notes 53-54.
94 See, for example, Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 88-89 (cited in note 34) (acknowledging an
academic consensus that immutable rules in contract can be normatively justified when third parties
"cannot adequately protect themselves").
95 See Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U Chi L Rev 895, 9 10-14 (2000) (book
review) (criticizing economists' identification of externalities as "covertly" dependent on moral as-
sumptions and political theory).
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dren? The answer requires a far more nuanced examination than
anyone thus far has provided of just what would motivate a "pri-
vacy"-type right in the marital property context.
Whatever attitude toward marital property the government
should take to be consistent with privacy in this context, it is
unlikely that such a requirement would ever technically be con-
stitutionalized in a technical sense. In part, this likely outcome is
purely practical-worries about how a court would administer
such a constitutional right, present in some debates about consti-
tutionalization of other rights,96 are significant in this context.
How would a court know whether rules were set to be facilitative
or normative, or as a matter of intent or of actual execution? And
would they mandate particular property rules as a remedy? It
seems highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would ignore the
serious practical problems that constitutionalization of such a
substantive, rather than formal, vision of neutrality poses. But
these concerns do not necessarily preclude the argument that
states ought to consider it their duty to be facilitative, rather
than normative, when it comes to marital property. Norms that
can effectively be constitutionalized do not constitute the entirety
of the universe of norms worth caring about.
Even putting aside the administrative difficulties with con-
stitutionalizing such a requirement, constitutionalization still
might seem unlikely. The doctrine of marital privacy has never
achieved constitutional status, despite the relative simplicity of
its application--courts could conceivably mandate staying out of
disputes between married people. The non-constitutionalization
of marital privacy might result from any number of things. It
might reflect skepticism about the relationship between formal
and substantive neutrality (that marital privacy really reflects
neutrality), or might reflect a reluctance to constitutionalize a
non-interference norm where one spouse has actually sought
government intervention. More profoundly, it might call into
question the thought that non-intervention in marriage is such
an important value.
In fact, there is something strange about protecting the pri-
vacy of intimate relationships that take the marital form. Civil
marriage is a governmental creation-a state institution that
private parties may or may not enter into, at will. Privacy norms
96 See, for example, Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Inter-
sections Between Law and Political Science, 20 Stan L Rev 169, 246-47 (1969) (outlining administra-
tive and practical problems with the judicial analysis of apportionment cases).
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much more typically embody negative liberties-freedom from
various government interventions, freedom to live one's life (or at
least aspects of one's life) as one wishes.97 But once a couple has
entered into legal marriage, they are, at least arguably, in the
range of the positive-within an optional government program
that may, permissibly, condition its benefits upon playing by its
rules.
Consider an analogy from parental rights. Government-
sponsored programs may require that parents behave in certain
state-preferred ways (for instance, revealing the identity of a
child's biological father) as a condition of receiving benefits, even
though the state could not directly require such behavior.98 Why
isn't the analysis the same for marriage? If the state wants to
give couples a benefit-an affirmative government program
called marriage-why can it not attempt to shape their behavior
within marriage?
The implication of this argument is that the matter might
look considerably different for the property rules that apply to
unmarried cohabitants than for the property rules that apply to
married people. Unmarried cohabitants have not "registered" to
receive any particular benefit. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is
even more academic and judicial support for facilitative property
rules for unmarried cohabitants-rules that reflect their actual
preferences. To a large extent, the rules relating to property divi-
sion for unmarried cohabitants attempt to track explicit or im-
plicit manifestations of their intent.99 The American Law Insti-
tute's new proposal for unmarried cohabitants-to treat them for
property purposes as though they were married after a sustained
period of cohabitation, regardless of whether they have given
other indications of a desire to share property in this wayt°° -has
met with a significant criticism on exactly this basis."1 Because
97 See, for example, Bowers v DeVito, 686 F2d 616, 618 (7th Cir 1982) ("The Constitution is a
charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal govern-
ment or the state to provide services.").
98 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Wel-
fare, 72 Denver U L Rev 931, 941-43 (1995) (describing how dependence on welfare operates as a
waiver of privacy).
99 See, for example, Tolan v Kimball, 33 P3d 1152 (Ala 2001) (finding property of unmarried
cohabitants to be divided based on the parties' intent); Beal v Beal, 577 P2d 507 (Or 1978) (holding the
same). Equitable doctrines, like quantam meruit, sometimes trump perceived intent. See, for example,
Watts v Watts, 405 NW2d 303, 306 (Wis 1987).
10 American Law Institute, Principles of Family Dissolution, §§ 6.03-6.06 (2003).
101 See, for example, Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law
Institute's "Domestic Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU L Rev 1189, 1213 ("The ALl [ ] proposes to
bind individuals to a contract that they have not made, to obligations they have not chosen to assume, to
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of the administrative difficulties in ascertaining intent, such a
facilitative approach to property rules among unmarried cohabi-
tants is unlikely to be a good candidate for constitutionalization,
but the intimacy/privacy argument about the content of intimate
relationships applies most naturally to intimate relationships
that do present the complication of how to categorize marriage.
To the extent that an argument based on intimacy can seem to
require the state to be "hands off' with respect to the property
relationship between intimates, perhaps that argument applies
only to unmarried cohabitants rather than to people who choose
to enter into the institution of marriage.
But this argument against a hands-off approach to marriage
may prove too much. The Supreme Court has already recognized
a right to marry, and has even given it constitutional status. °2
This right would seem to be subject to the same critique. The
right to marry is, structurally, not the same as the right (which
may potentially exist post-Lawrence) to have recreational sex.
The right to marry is, perversely, not a privacy-based right to be
left alone, but rather a right to have the state interfere in the re-
lationship.
The debates about same-sex marriage will surely reflect this
awkwardness in the right to marry. Arguments to extend mar-
riage to same-sex couples that are based on the particularly sus-
picious nature of sexual-orientation... or sex-based..4 categoriza-
tions do not require reliance on the right to marry. But for
broader claims for same-sex marriage that resound in a privacy
right around marriage-that it is not the government's business
to say who may or may not marry-distinctions are harder to
draw. This is not to say that they could not be drawn, just as
Lawrence drew a line, based on exploitation between consensual
sex between adults and sex involving minors or sex for financial
profit.' But the easiest argument for restricting marriage to its
commitments they have not agreed to assume.").
102 See text accompanying notes 72-86.
103 See, for example, Richard Delgado, Fact, Norm, and Standard of Review-The Case of Homo-
sexuality, 10 U Dayton L Rev 575, 583-85 (1985) (evaluating the idea that homosexuals represent a
"quasi-suspect" class); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 Harv L Rev 1285, 1287-92 (1985) (arguing that an equal protection approach
would better produce equality for homosexuals than would dependence on the more specific and lim-
ited protections of privacy rights, such as the right to marry).
104 See, for example, Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination, 69 NYU L Rev 197, 199 (1994) (arguing that discrimination against homosexuals
is sex discrimination in that it "reinforces the hierarchy of males over females").
105 Lawrence, 123 S Ct at 2484. The best arguments for prohibiting siblings and polygamists from
marrying would have to be based on similar concerns about exploitation.
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more usual forms-that the government makes marriage, and
that it ought to be able therefore to say what marriage is-is
challenged by the existence of the positive right to participate in
the government institution.
One easy option for working one's way out of this conundrum
would be to deny the existence of the right to marry in the first
place. This would not necessarily require concluding that the Su-
preme Court has always been wrong. At a time when marriage
carried with it a degree of monopoly power over other private
behaviors-reproduction and sex, most specifically-the right to
marry may have been necessary to protect other private behav-
iors.' 6 As that degree of monopoly power lessens-in Lawrence,
in particular, over recreational sex-the need for a right to marry
may correspondingly disappear."7
But there may be more going on with the right to marry
than just marriage's relationship to other protected activities.
Though it takes the form of a government benefits package, legal
marriage plays a social role that is far more profound and per-
sonal. Couples seem to care about legally marrying for reasons
that have nothing at all to do with the legal consequences-
reasons that are more deeply personal."8 This makes marriage
itself a sort of hybrid institution, both personal and governmen-
tal, a tool both for personal intimate expression and for govern-
mental control. And the question of what the state should do
about marital property is, really, no less than the question of
which of those characters ought to control, or whether there is
some way of accommodating both of them simultaneously.
106 See Case, 2004 S Ct Rev at 52 (cited in note 77). See also Zablocki, 434 US at 386 ("[If the]
right to procreate means anything it all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which
the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.").
107 See Case, 2004 S Ct Rev at 52 (cited in note 77).
108 See text accompanying notes 30-31.
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